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THE RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES CLAUSE IN
UNITED STATES TREATIES: AN ANTITRUST
TRANQUILIZER FOR INTERNATIONAL TRADE
JAMES T. HAIGHT"
THE Restrictive Business Practices Clause is an important but little used
paragraph which first appeared in the United States Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce, and Navigation with Italy in 1948. This clause calls for inter-
governmental consultation and action with respect to restrictive business prac-
tices which may have harmful effects upon commerce between the two countries.
The provision is an effective part of eight treaties now in force.
How did this provision get into these treaties? Why is it there? How has
it been used? What value has it in the future? These questions have never
been fully or officially answered by either the Department of State or the De-
partment of Justice.
POSTWAR ANTICARTEL ACTIVITIES
As Allied guns were booming on the Brittany peninsula in 1944, President
Franklin D. Roosevelt took time from his military responsibilities to address
a letter to Cordell Hull, Secretary of State. The President mentioned the need
to eradicate the German cartel structure after the war and then went on to
declare that all "cartel practices" which might restrict the free flow of goods
in foreign commerce would have to be curbed, perhaps by joint action of the
United Nations. He concluded,
I hope that you will keep your eye on this whole subject of international
cartels because we are approaching the time when discussions will almost
certainly arise between us and other nations.1
The Secretary of State replied, indicating (not unexpectedly) agreement
with the points outlined by F.D.R. and noting that an interdepartmental com-
mittee had been established to keep a continuing watch over cartel matters.
Mr. Hull alerted the top-flight Executive Committee on Economic Foreign
Policy to be ready on short notice with definitive policy proposals.2 The Ex-
ecutive Branch had begun its postwar effort to clarify its responsibility in
applying America's antitrust policies to restraints on international commerce.
During the next decade and a half, United States efforts would be directed,
in part, to multilateral arrangements relating to restraints in international
tMember of the District of Columbia, Ohio and Wisconsin Bars; Attorney, Akron, Ohio.
1. Letter From the President to the Secretary of State, Sept. 6, 1944, in 11 DEP'T
STATE BULL. 254 (1944).
2. Letter From the Secretary of State to the President, Sept. 11, 1944, in 11 DEP'T
STATE Bur.L. 292-93 (1944).
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trade. The United Nations did not itself take up the cartel question at once but it
did sponsor publication of a research paper drafted by the old League of
Nations Secretariat. This paper concluded that while international cartels
might be useful in some circumstances, "intergovernmental agreements may
be necessary to regulate them."3 Meanwhile, during the Anglo-American
loan negotiations in 1945, the United States had proposed that the parties
conclude a multilateral agreement under which the nations would pledge them-
selves to take effective steps to prevent their nationals from engaging in price
fixing, market sharing, or other practices restraining trade. A British counter-
proposal suggested that a consultative body be formed to which any country
could report its fears that an international cartel was acting in restraint of
trade.4 When the International Trade Organization (ITO) was proposed
by the United States under the 1948 Havana Charter, it was to include a
Commission on Business Practices. The commission's main function would
have been to:
1. Inquire into activities on the part of private commercial enterprises
which have the effect or purpose of restraining international trade, re-
stricting access to international markets, or of fostering monopolistic
controls in international trade.5
The ITO never got off the ground, because the United States Senate refused
to ratify it. However the germ of the charter's commission idea was carried
into the United States commercial treaty program.
THE RESTRI CTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES CLAUSE
President Truman presented to the United States Senate on April 14, 1948
a Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation with the new Italian
Republic. The treaty had been signed at Rome on February 2, 1948, replacing
a treaty signed at Florence in 1871.
The Restrictive Business Practices Clause appeared in this treaty for the
first time. It reads:
The two High Contracting Parties agree that business practices which
restrain competition, limit access to markets or foster monopolistic control,
and which are engaged in or made effective by one or more private or
public commercial enterprises or by combination, agreement or other
arrangement among public or private commercial enterprises may have
harmful effects upon the commerce between their respective territories.
Accordingly, each High Contracting Party agrees upon the request of
the other High Contracting Party to consult with respect to any such
practices and to take such measures as it deems appropriate with a view
to eliminating such harmful effects. 6
3. UNITED NATIONS, INTERNATIONAL CARTELS 48-52 (1947).
4. N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1945, p. 2, col. 8.
5. Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization, March 24, 1948, U.S.
DEP'T STATE PuB. No. 3206, COMMERCIAL POuCY SERIES 114 (1948).
6. Treaty With Italy on Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, Feb. 2, 1948, art.
XVIII, para 3, 63 Stat. 2255, T.I.A.S. No. 1965 (effective July 26, 1949).
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In its report to the President, the State Department vaguely described this
new provision as "arising directly from recent developments in international
economic relations." It added, equally vaguely,
The provisions relating to exchange controls, state trading, and restrictive
trade practices have been formulated in the light of recent experience
with such economic devices, and it is believed that for the most part these
articles will eliminate the most discriminatory features and thereby lessen
possible harmful effects upon American business activity. 7
Explaining the clause to the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, the
State Department spokesman advised that it was "directed at the cartel or
monopoly situation." Its purpose was "to provide a mechanism for doing
something about it." s The State Department has, through a variety of inter-
governmental mechanisms, continued its attempts to eliminate both public and
private restrictions in international trade. Bilateral treaties under the ECA
program with Western European countries have contained provisions attack-
ing the problem. 9 The decartelization program in Western Germany and in
Japan was pressed forward.?° But the commercial treaty program re-
mains an important tool.
In furtherance of this program, twenty commercial treaties have been
negotiated by the United States since the end of World War II,11 of which
thirteen have come into force.' 2 The Restrictive Business Practices Clause
was incorporated substantially without change in eight of them. In addition
7. Report of the Secretary of State to the President, April 13, 1948, printed in
Message from the President transmitting the Treaty to the Senate, S. ExEc. E, 80th
Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1948). The report also stated that the Restrictive Trade Practices
Clause was similar to the article proposed by the United States for the charter of the
ITO.
8. Hearing before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
on a proposed Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation between the U.S. and
the Italian Republic, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1948).
9. E.g., Economic Cooperation Agreement with the United Kingdom, July 6, 1948,
art. II, para. 3, 62 Stat. 2596, T.I.A.S. No. 1795.
10. See Dep't of State Press Release, Dec. 1, 1949, 21 DEP'T STATE BULL. 910 (1949).
Other activities are described in the REPORT OF THE DEP'T OF STATE TO THE SUBCOM-
MITTEE ON MONOPOLY OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTE ON SMALL BUSINESS, FOREIGN
LEGISLATION CONCERNING MONOPOLY AND CARTEL PRACTICES, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 171-78
(1952).
11. "Commercial treaties" in this sense includes the standard treaties of friendship,
commerce, and navigation; treaties of amity, economic relations, and consular rights;
conventions of establishment; and similar treaties dealing with general economic relations,
the encouragement of commerce, and the protection of persons and investments. For a
general description of the program, see Commercial Treaty Program of the United States,
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Pun. No. 6565, COMMERCIAL POLICY SERIES 163 (1958).
12. After negotiation and initial signature, a treaty must be ratified by the parties.
In the United States, this requires the advice and consent of the Senate, prior to ratifi-
cation by the President. Only after ratifications are exchanged does a treaty come into
force. This process is described fully in 2 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LANV 1429-52 (1951).
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to the treaty with Italy, the clause is part of the following Treaties of Friend-
ship, Commerce, and Navigation: Ireland,' 3 Israel, 14 Greece, 15 Japan, 6 Ger-
many,17 Korea,' 8 and Nicaragua.' 9
The clause is not contained in the commercial treaties with Nationalist
China,20 Ethiopia,21 Iran,22 the Netherlands, 23 and Muscat and Oman.2 4 It is
missing from the Chinese treaty because the clause was only a gleam in its
author's eye in 1946. The Ethiopian, Iranian, and Muscat and Oman treaties
are abridged versions of the standard commercial treaty, because of the rela-
tively undeveloped status of these countries.25 The absence of the clause in the
treaty with the Netherlands has not been officially explained. However, it is
known that the Netherlands Government flatly refused to accept the clause.
13. Treaty With Ireland of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, Jan. 21, 1950,
art. XV, para. 1, [1950] 1 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 785, T.I.A.S. No. 2155 (effective Sept. 14, 1950).
14. Treaty With Israel of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, Aug. 23, 1951, art.
XVII, para. 1, [1954] 1 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 550, T.I.A.S. No. 2948 (effective April 3, 1954).
15. Treaty With Greece of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, Aug. 3, 1951,
art. XIV, para. 1, [1954] 2 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 1829, T.I.A.S. No. 3057 (effective Oct.
13, 1954).
16. Treaty With Japan of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, April 2, 1953,
art. XVIII, para. 1, [1953] 2 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 2063, T.I.A.S. No. 2863 (effective Oct.
30, 1953).
17. Treaty With Germany of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, Oct. 29, 1954,
art. XVIII, para. 1, [1956] 2 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 1839, T.I.A.S. No. 3593 (effective July
14, 1956). This treaty modified the final clause of standard Restrictive Business Prac-
tices Clause by adding the italicized language:
Accordingly, each Government agrees upon the request of the other Government
to consult with respect to any such practices and to take such measures, not pre-
cluded by its legislation, as it deems appropriate with a view to eliminating such
harmful effect.
18. Treaty With Korea of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, Nov. 28, 1956,
art. XVIII, para. 1, [1957] 2 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 2217, T.I.A.S. No. 3947 (effective Nov.
7, 1957).
19. Treaty With Nicaragua of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, Jan. 21, 1956,
art. XVIII, para. 1, [1958] 1 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 449, T.I.A.S. No. 4024 (effective May
24, 1958).
20. Treaty With The Republic of China of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation,
Nov. 4, 1946, 63 Stat. 1299, T.I.A.S. No. 1871 (effective Nov. 30, 1948).
21. Treaty With Ethiopia of Amity and Economic Relations, Sept. 7, 1951, [1953] 2
U.S.T. & O.I.A. 2134, T.I.A.S. No. 2864 (effective Oct. 8, 1953).
22. Treaty With Iran of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights, Aug. 15,
1955, [1957] 1 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 899, T.I.A.S. No. 3853 (effective June 16, 1957).
23. Treaty With The Netherlands of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, March
27, 1956, [1957] 2 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 2043, T.I.A.S. No. 3942 (effective Dec. 5, 1957).
24. Treaty With the Sultan of Muscat and Oman of Amity, Economic Relations, and
Consular Rights, Dec. 20, 1958, T.I.A.S. No. 4530 (effective June 11, 1960).
25. Report of the Acting Secretary of State to the President, February 19, 1959,
printed in S. ExEc. A., 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1959) ; S. EXEc. REP. No. 1, 86th Cong.,
1st Sess. 4 (1959). Abridged versions are further explained in Walker, Modern Treaties
of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, 42 MINN. L. REv. 805, 807 (1958).
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While negotiations were under way, the Justice Department was prosecuting
Netherlands companies-N. V. Philips, for one-in antitrust litigation. The
Netherlands Government, incensed at these proceedings, stoutly refused to
undertake any commitment that might involve them in giving effect to United
States antitrust laws in the Netherlands.
Not many private organizations take the trouble to comment on proposed
treaties. One organization that frequently does is the National Foreign Trade
Council (NFTC). When half a dozen treaties were pending before the Senate
in 1952, the NFTC questioned the desirability of including the Restrictive
Business Practices Clause in four of them.
In a statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the NFTC de-
clared that while it had originally viewed the clause as being merely a con-
demnation of practices contrary to the letter and spirit of American antitrust
law, it subsequently revised its view in the light of the constitutional declara-
tion that treaties become the supreme law of the land. Consequently, the
NFTC feared, the clause might transfer to the Executive Branch of the Gov-
ernment some of the reserve powers of Congress. The NFTC warned that
the phrase binding the United States "to take such measures as it deems
appropriate with a view to eliminating such harmful effects" might be construed
as an enlargement of the powers of the Executive Branch, committing this
country to eliminate "harmful effects" from restrictive business practices
whether or not such practices in a particular case were in violation of existing
U.S. antitrust laws. 26 The NFTC suggested that the language be revised ex-
plicitly to obligate the United States to take only those steps authorized by
appropriate legislation of Congress.
The State Department acted promptly to quash this construction of its treaty.
In a memorandum to the Foreign Relations Committee, the Department pointed
out that the Restrictive Business Practices Clause was designed to enlist the co-
operation of foreign governments in the efforts of the United States to reduce the
adverse effects of cartels and other restrictive practices on international trade.
It will be observed that the clause is not self-executing, and it is also
cautiously worded otherwise. The commitments are (1) to consult, i.e., to
hold discussions, and (2) to take such action as each party deems appro-
priate, in its own discretion and in its own way, with a view to eliminating
the harmful effects of defined practices on international trade. While the
holding of consultations would be an executive function, any action that
the United States might see fit to take would be the normal combination
of congressional, executive, and judicial action that exists apart from the
treaty. The clause has, furthermore, been drafted in such manner as to
avoid conflict with the Webb-Pomerene Act and the other enactments
which represent exceptions to the basic antitrust law of the United States.
26. Hearing before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relatiots
on Treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation between the U.S. and Colombia,
Israel, Ethiopia, Italy, Denmark, and Greece, S. ExEcs. M & R, 82d Cong., 1st Sess.,
S. Exlcs. F, H, I, J, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 23-25 (1952).
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The clause is not regarded as creating new substantive antitrust law or
new procedures of antitrust enforcement in the United States.
It may be stated categorically that the restrictive business practices clause
is not in any way designed to enhance executive power or to alter estab-
lished congressional-executive-judicial relationships in the formulation and
execution of antitrust policy. In the State Department's view, the Executive
would be bound, in carrying out the clause, to proceed in conformity with
statutes duly enacted by the Congress; and there is no intent to authorize
the contrary. A proviso spelling out the internal processes by which the
United States acts is therefore unnecessary; it would also appear to be
inappropriate in an international instrument, since it is not the concern
of a foreign government.27
Due to the press of other business, the Senate committee did not act in 1952
on these pending commercial treaties.
When a special Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee met in 1953 to discuss
commercial treaties, it went over the same ground once more with the repre-
sentative of the State Department, who assured Senator Hickenlooper and the
committee that the Restrictive Business Practices Clause would convey no
legislative authority to the Executive Branch.28 When the committee reported
the treaties favorably to the Senate, it specifically noted the objection of the
National Foreign Trade Council to the restrictive business practices provisions.
After citing the State Department's 1952 memorandum on the subject, the
committee report stated:
The committee in giving its advice and consent to the treaties with re-
strictive business practices clauses which contain an undertaking on the
part of the United States to take measures it deems appropriate to elimi-
nate restrictive practices, or other similar language, does so with the
clear understanding that this does not confer authority upon the Execu-
tive to take steps in this respect not heretofore or hereafter authorized
by Congress.-
With this explanation before it, the Senate gave its advice and consent to
the ratification of four commercial treaties containing the Clause. 0
In 1955 a new Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with the
Federal Republic of Germany was presented to the Senate. It contained the
27. Id. at 29.
28. Hearing before the Subcommittee of the Sentate Committee on Foreign Relatio
ons Treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation with Israel, Ethiopia, Italy, Den-
mark, Greece, Finland, Germany, and Japan, S. EXEC. R, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., S. ExEc.
F, H, I, J, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., S. ExEcs. C, N, 0, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 20-21 (July 13,
1953).
29. S. EXEc. REP. No. 5, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1953). This assurance by the De-
partment of State obviated any need for a specific reservation in the clause. See dis-
cussion in ABA, REPORT OF THE CoMM. ON INT'L TRADE REGULATION, SECTION OF
INT'L AND CoMPARATiV LAw, IMPACT OF ANTITRUST LAws ON FOREIGN TRADE, 10-11
(Aug. 6, 1953).
30. 99 CONG. REc. 9316-17 (1953). Three of these treaties have entered into force:
those with Israel, Greece and Japan; the fourth, with Denmark, has not.
19601
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standard Restrictive Business Practices Clause. Again the National Foreign
Trade Council objected, this time on the ground that the provision might
give Germany the right to demand enforcement of American antitrust laws
against Americans. The NFTC also suggested that the treaty provision
echoed the rejected (Havana Charter) proposal to create a United Nations
control agency to supervise the enforcement by the United States of its anti-
trust laws against American nationals, and to supervise the enforcement of
the relatively ineffective or nonexistent laws of other countries against their
nationals.31
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, after noting NFTC's objection,
stated in its report:
Attention was also given to the suggestion that article XVIII(1)
might be construed as authorizing the German Government to demand
enforcement of American law against Americans in so far as that law
concerns antitrust legislation even though there might be no similar
legislation in existence in Germany. The Committee understands this
provision to be reciprocal in nature and that it does not give either the Ger-
man or the United States Governments any right to insist that measures
referred to in this article are to be enforced on a unilateral basis. 32
The meaning of "reciprocal in nature" is unclear. Perhaps the Committee in-
tended that Germany would only be entitled to request, rather than require,
enforcement of the American antitrust laws against domestic American firms.
Possibly the Committee meant that Germany could request enforcement of our
antitrust laws against our citizens only if we had the right to request enforcement
of German antitrust laws against Germans, and similar German laws in fact
existed. 33 Whatever the language meant, the Senate ratified the Treaty.
Seven commercial treaties negotiated since 1945 have not yet come into
force. In this class are Treaties of Friendship and Commerce with Colombia, 34
Denmark,35 Haiti,36 Uruguay,37 and Pakistan,38 a supplemental commercial
31. S. EXEC. PEP. No. 10, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1955).
32. Id. at 3. See also note 17 supra for the variant language employed in this treaty
to underscore the Foreign Relations Committee's statement.
33. A German antitrust law in fact was passed two years later, Law Against Restraints
of Competition of July 27, 1957, effective Jan. 1, 1958, translated and reprinted in WORLD
TRADE INFORMATION SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, No. 58-1, pt. 1 (1958).
34. Treaty With Colombia of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, Apr. 26, 1951,
S. ExEc. M, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951).
35. Treaty With Denmark of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, Oct. 1, 1951,
S. EXEC. I, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952).
36. Treaty With Haiti of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, March 8, 1955,
S. EXEC. H, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955).
37. Treaty Wtih Uruguay of Friendship, Commerce, and Economic Development,
Nov. 23, 1949, S. ExEc. D, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950). A protocol supplementing this
treaty was signed at Montevideo, May 19, 1955.
38. Treaty With Pakistan of Friendship and Commerce, Nov. 12, 1959, S. ExEc. F,
86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960).
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Agreement with Italy,39 and a Convention of Establishment with France.40
The United States Senate, during its postconvention session on August 17,
1960, gave its advice and consent to the ratification of the Treaty with Pakistan
and the Convention with France.41 Both agreements contain the Restrictive
Business Practices Clause, although that with France is somewhat watered
down. 42 The clause is also included in the postwar treaties negotiated with
Colombia, Denmark, and Uruguay, but it is not clear that these treaties will ever
come into force.
Thus, the Restrictive Business Practices Clause currently appears in eight
bilateral treaties in force, and in two more on the verge of becoming effective.
It may become even more broadly applicable as additional treaties are ne-
gotiated.
THE TREATY CLAUSE AS CONSTRUED IN UNITED STATES COURTS
In two cases, federal courts have been asked to throw out antitrust charges
because of the existence of the Restrictive Business Practices Clause.
The first case, United States v. R. P. Oldham Co.,43 was a criminal action
charging a conspiracy in restraint of American commerce brought under
section 1 of the Sherman Act and section 73 of the Wilson Tariff Act. The
indictment named five United States corporations importing Japanese wire
nails and an American subsidiary of a Japanese nail export company as
defendants, and added several Japanese firms as co-conspirators. The defend-
ants moved to dismiss the indictment, contending that the consultation clause
of the United States-Japanese commercial treaty 44 provided the exclusive
remedy available to the United States Government in reaching the antitrust
conspiracy. District Judge Murphy would not accept this argument, and
denied the motion to dismiss. He found the clause to be permissive, not
mandatory or exclusive. Although it was not cited, the legislative history of
the treaty clause fully supports this result. As additional support for the dis-
missal Judge Murphy relied on the American nationality of the defendants,
39. Agreement With Italy Supplementing the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and
Navigation of 1948, Sept. 26, 1951, S. ExEc. H, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952).
40. Convention of Establishment With France, Nov. 25, 1959, S. ExEc. G, 86th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1960).
41. 106 CONG. REc. 15367-76, 15417-18 (daily ed., Aug. 17, 1960). Both agreements were
ratified by President Eisenhower on August 29, 1960. 43 DEP'T STATE BUrL. 545 (1960).
42. Article XI:
Each High Contracting Party will take the measures it deems appropriate with a
view to preventing commercial practices or arrangments, whether effected by one or
more private or public commercial enterprises, which restrain competition, limit
access to markets or foster monopolistic control, whenever such practices or ar-
rangements have or might have harmful effects on trade between the two countries.
106 CoNG. REc. 15372 (daily ed., Aug. 17, 1960).
43. 152 F. Supp. 818 (N.D. Cal. 1957).
44. See note 16 -supra.
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saying that "certainly the Treaty was not intended to exempt nationals from
the sanctions of their own country's laws."'4
5
In the second case, In the Matter of Grand Jury Investigation of the Ship-
ping Industry,46 the same clause was invoked at an earlier stage of a
proceeding. The Justice Department-under prodding by a congressional
committee-initiated in late 1959 an investigation of possible law violations
in the ocean shipping industry. A grand jury was convened in the District of
Columbia. Over 150 respondents were directed to produce documents. Viola-
tions of the antitrust laws and of the Shipping Act were suspected.
Six Japanese shipping lines moved to quash the subpoenas duces tecum on
the ground that forced production of documents would violate the clause of
the commercial treaty between the United States and Japan.47 District Judge
Walsh refused to grant the motion, holding (as in the Oldhan case) that the
Restrictive Business Practices Clause is neither a mandatory nor an exclusive
remedy. Forced production of documents located in the United States does
not violate the clause, he held, even though no consultation had preceded the
commencement of the investigation. However the judge reserved his opinion.
as to the need to produce documents located abroad, in view of a mass of protests
from foreign Governments whose lines would be affected.
Although official protests to the production of documents of foreign shipping
lines were made by ten interested Governments, only one nation actually invoked
the Restrictive Business Practices Clause of its commercial treaty with the
United States. In a note to the American Secretary of State, which was trans-
mitted to the court, Italy declared:
The Italian Embassy submits that, with respect to matters such as those
apparently involved in the instant proceedings, proper machinery is set
forth in Article XVIII of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navi-
gation existing between the United States and Italy, and both high con-
tracting parties should take recourse, in all instances, to the same.
... If the United States wishes consultations regarding issues actually
contemplated by the instant proceedings, the Italian Government would
be willing to meet such request pursuant to and in the spirit of Article
XVIII of the existing treaty.4"
The Department of State replied to the Italian protest note in an aide-memoire,
attaching a memorandum by the Department of Justice dealing geneally with
the right of production of documents in grand jury investigations. However
neither the aide-memoire nor the legal memorandum so much as mentioned the
treaty clause cited by the Italian Government.
Judge Walsh ignored Italy's claim in his opinion, no doubt because the Italian
lines, constituting several of the actual parties to the suit, did not specify the
45. 152 F. Supp. at 823.
46. 1960 Trade Cas. 1 69746 (D.D.C. 1960).
47. See note 16 supra.
48. Note in docket file Misc. 5-60, D.D.C., March 5, 1960.
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clause as a technical ground for their motions to quash the subpoenas. In his
Shipping Industry opinion, Judge Walsh did mention, without elaboration, that
the protest of the Ambassador of Japan did not cite the Restrictive Business
Practices Clause of the United States-Japanese commercial treaty. The court
might well have been more troubled had the official protest itself, as well as the
motions to quash of the Japanese lines, specifically relied on the consultative
clause. If this had been done, production under the subpoena could well have
been delayed until full and serious consultation had been completed. Such a
course would have satisfied the obligations of the treaty, without slighting the
power of the United States legislation.
The courts in these two cases re-emphasize the point made in the course of
congressional hearings on the commercial treaty program: the Restrictive Busi-
ness Practices Clause is not "new law" overriding or conflicting with American
antitrust legislation. Rather the clause should be a tranquilizing agent to which
nations can turn to encourage free international intercourse. But how effective
has the clause been in this regard?
INTERAGENCy DISCUSSION OF INTERNATIONAL ANTIRUST DISPUTES
Let us examine the mechanics for establishing a position within the United
States Government when an antitrust problem arises having international im-
pact. After all, the heart of the question lies in the use prior to litigation of the
consultative procedure suggested by the treaty clause.
Although responsibility for effective enforcement of federal antitrust laws
rest in part with the Federal Trade Commission, in part with other agencies,4 9
and even with private parties, it is principally the Department of Justice which
is concerned with problems of extraterritorial enforcement of the Sherman
Act. A curtain of secrecy usually shields the process by which the Justice De-
partment's Antitrust Division decides whether to prosecute or withhold prose-
cution in the case of international business arrangements which might violate
United States laws. However a hint occasionally appears as to how it is done.
Apparently as a practical matter the Departments of State and Justice work
closely together to develop solutions in antitrust cases which have foreign policy
implications. Recent examples include the Swiss Watch, the Oil Cartel, and the
49. Among other agencies having some responsibility for enforcement of federal anti-
trust laws in international trade are these: the International Cooperation Administration
which reviews applications for an investment guaranty from the antitrust standpoint by
submitting these agreements for review to the business practices and technology staff
of the Department of State, and considers the effect on United States foreign trade of
any restrictive provisions. Hearings pursuant to S. Res. 61 Before the Subcommittee on
Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 1st Sess.,
pt. 4, at 1826-29 (1955). The Federal Maritime Board reviews shipping conference agree-
ments in foreign trade, and approved agreements are exempted from the antitrust laws under
certain conditions. 39 Stat. 733 (1916), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1958). See gen-
erally BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 414-30 (1958); FUGATE,
FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS 294-300 (1958).
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United Fruit cases. 5° This cooperative effort has been so regularized that the
Straus Report in 1959 stated, without qualification,
The Department of Justice in recent years has not taken any action
involving foreign relations without prior consultation with the Depart-
ment of State.5 1
The apparent closeness of this working relationship between the two depart-
ments may, however, be open to question. The 1955 Report of the Attorney
General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws asserted that a
pressing need existed at that time for advance consultation between the
Department of Justice and affected United States Government agencies con-
cerning projected antitrust proceedings in the foreign field.5 2
More often than not, several other United States Government agencies
will also have an interest in antitrust proceedings in the international field.
Certainly these agencies frequently may be involved: the International Co-
operation Administration, Department of Defense, Office of Defense Mobiliza-
tion, Department of Commerce, Treasury, the Federal Trade Commission, and
the Tariff Commission.
Regular consultation by the Justice Department with other interested agen-
cies, before commencing a broad investigation or bringing any antitrust pro-
ceeding in the international field, would undoubtedly result in a more accurate
assessment of possible damage to America's international position.5 3 By con-
sidering the economic, legal and political situation prevailing in foreign countries
before deciding whether to institute antitrust proceedings, the Executive Branch
should be able to avoid any unnecessary strains on our foreign relations which
might follow from improper timing and handling of antitrust prosecutions.
Final responsiblity for evaluation of the political questions should not rest with
50. Hearings, stpra note 49, at 1846, 1848 (statement of Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State Kalijarvi).
51. Straus, Expanding Private Investment for Free World Economic Growth, DEP'T
OF STATE 30 (1959). This report recommends that the Department of State always be
consulted in advance antitrust clearance cases involving the interest of a foreign govern-
ment or a possible conflict with foreign la v. Id. at 31. The interesting comments of the
Department of Justice on this recommend,!ion may be found in letters to Sen. Jacob
K. Javits dated June 17, 1959, and Dec. 9, 1959, printed in 106 CONG. REc. 5762-63 (daily
ed., March 22, 1960).
.52. -Anf-y -GEN. NAT'L Comm. ANTiTRUST REP. 97-98 (1955). This recommendation
was rejedted as "inadequate" by the special committee report of the AssocATxoN OF THE
BAR- O F'THEITy OF NEW YORK, NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY IN THE APPLI-
CATION OF AmERICAN ANTITRUST LAws TO COmmERCE wrrH FoREIGN NATIONs 25-26 (1957).
The recdirhmendation was praised by the Department of State soon after its appearance.
Hearings, supra note 49, at 698-99; Hearings before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the
House Committee on the Judiciary, "Current Antitrust Problems," 84th Cong., 1st Sess.,
pt. II, at 698-99 (1955).
53. See BREWSTER, op. cit. supra note 49, at 418-40, 444-45. In the same way, judges
in antitrust litigation must weigh the possible conflict of proposed relief with foreign laws,
or with other possibly-conflicting U.S. legislative objectives.
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the prosecutor, the Department of Justice. Only the President can exercise the
responsiblity for final decision. 4
EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS
PRACTICES CLAUSE
Preventing Intergovernmental Friction
In connection with antitrust litigation in United States courts, bilateral con-
sultation with other interested nations is entirely practical. The former Legal
Adviser to the Department of State, Loftus E. Becker, recently discussed
the role of that Department in attempting to resolve foreign policy problems
arising in the administration of American antitrust laws. He declared,
I believe that the Department of State could do more in the way of
affirmative consultation with the foreign governments concerned, with
the view of obtaining agreement that specific practices or arrangements
are, or are not, contrary to our mutual interests. We would not, of course,
be successful in reaching intergovernmental agreement in every such in-
stance, as the Swiss Watch case demonstrates. But the fact that the
foreign government in question had been consulted in advance would
tend to lessen the violence of its reaction to enforcement of our law.
Moreover, through such consultation, both the Department of State, and
through it, the Department of Justice would be in a better position to
receive and evaluate facts and arguments as to why the particular ar-
rangement or activity should not be proceeded against under our law.
I have no doubt that if this were done in more cases than it is done at
present, there would be instances in which the two Departments would
be thus persuaded by the foreign government, although they might not
have been so persuaded had the same arguments been made by attorneys
representing private litigants.56
But it is essential that intergovernmental consultations take place before the
antitrust proceeding is brought. Examples are discouragingly many where
consultations were forced upon the United States by miffed nations who
learned about a new lawsuit via press service teletype. 6 For example, in late
54. See National Security and Foreign Policy, supra note 52, at 26-29.
55. Becker, The Antitrust Law and Relations with Foreign Nations, in N.Y. STATE
BAR Ass'N, SEcEioN ON ANTITRUST LAW, How To COMPLY Wr THE CLAYToN AcT
51, 59 (1959). Similar suggestions for more frequent bilateral consultations between
governments have been made recently. See Brewster, Remarks on the Extraterritorial
Application of Federal Antitrust Laws, id. at 63, 67; Kahn-Freund, Extraterritorial
Application of Antitrust Laws, 1957 London Proceedings, ABA, SECTION OF INT'L AND
ComP. LAw, 33, at 42 (19 ) ; Timberg, Remarks on Extraterritorial Enforcement of
the Sherman Act, id. 51, at 54.
56. Consultations in the Oil Cartel case resulted from strong protests received by the
State Department after the Justice Department instituted the litigation. Arabian states,
the United Kingdom, and France objected. Hearings, supra note 52, at 695-96. Other
recent examples of foreign government protests are noted-for differing reasons- in G. W.
Haight, Antitrust Laws and the Territorial Principle, 11 VAND. L. REv. 27, 33-34
(1957); Timberg, Conflict and Growth in the International and Comparative Law of
Antitrust, in 4 ABA, Section of Int'l and Comp. Law Bull. July, 1960, p. 20.
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1958 the Department of Justice filed a complaint in a New York federal court
against General Electric, Westinghouse, and N. V. Philips for an alleged
restraint of United States exports to Canada of radio and TV sets. The means
alleged was a Canadian patent pool operated by the Canadian subsidiaries of
these and other companies. Within days of the filing of the complaint, the
Canadian government roared loudly and publicly in protest at this interference
in its internal affairs.57 In a statement to the Canadian House of Commons
the Canadian Minister of Justice, Mr. E. D. Fulton, remarked that he had told
the United States Attorney General that:
If the American Government has any feeling that actions in Canada in
this or any other field are counter to American interests, or involve any
infringement of arrangements with respect to commerce between our two
countries, the proper course for them is not to seek to alter the situation
in Canada by means of unilateral action in United States courts, but
rather to raise the problem with the Canadian Government and express
their views and desires through the usual channels.5 8
The Minister added that both Governments had agreed to commence discus-
sions in the future at an earlier stage of the proceedings. He described this
understanding on prior consultation as "a real accomplishment."5 9
It now appears to be regular practice to notify the relevant embassy through
the State Department before any civil proceeding is instituted. This gives
foreign companies concerned an opportunity to discuss the matter with the
Department of Justice. But this policy has not been regularly followed in
regard to criminal proceedings.
In the course of the Grand Jury Investigation of the Shipping Industry, dis-
cussed in the preceding section of this article, an attempt was made to subpoena
documents of foreign shipping lines. The State Department promptly received
protests from the embassies of Great Britain, Canada, Denmark, France, Ger-
many, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden. 60 The State
57. The civil suit was filed Nov. 24, 1958. United States v. General Electric, Civ.
140-157, D.J. Case No. 1424, S.D.N.Y. 1958. The Canadian Government promptly made
arrangements to discuss the matter with United States officials. Canadian Hansard, Jan.
19, 1959, p. 25. Talks were held in Washington on Jan. 29, 1959, between the Canadian
Minister of Justice and William P. Rogers, U.S. Attorney General, with senior officials
of their respective departments present. The Canadian officials made it clear that the
decree requested by the Department of Justice "could only be regarded as an infringement
of Canadian sovereignty."
58. Statement of the Minister of Justice to the House of Commons, Canadian Han-
sard, Feb. 3, 1959.
59. Ibid.
60. A typical protest note is that of the Netherlands, dated March 7, 1960, addressed
to the Secretary of State. Its text, in part, reads:
These subpoenas refer to the production for use by the Grand Jury of a great
variety of documents inside the United States, and also of documents located out-
side the United States. Furthermore, they not only refer to the activities of ship-
ping companies in the United States, but also to shipping between foreign ports.
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Department and the Department of Justice quickly arranged a meeting with
the various interested embassies in Washington.6 At the close of the session
one foreign delegate said that the meeting was "almost an insult." Another
said that it had brought to light "nothing we didn't already know."6' 2 The
protests were submitted to the court in connection with motions to quash the
subpoenas. The court held that it had "the power, authority, and jurisdiction
to require the production of all the documents called for in all of the subpenas
herein involved." But Judge Walsh recognized that the "timely objections"
of the embassies should be given the greatest consideration. He dismissed their
objections as to documents physically located in this country. However, he
significantly ruled that,
. . .with respect to the documents of foreign corporations physically
located in foreign countries, it would seem that this investigation would
not be impeded if the Court reserved its opinion on the production of
those documents at this time. 3
The protests thus proved effective in deferring the production of documents
located abroad.
The Shipping Industry case disclosed the inadequacy of present consultation
procedures. While consultation prior to the filing of a civil complaint or a
criminal indictment is certainly desirable, intergovernment discussions should
really begin prior to the investigative stage. When the enveloping tentacles
of a grand jury subpoena reach into dusty files of offices around the world,
foreign governments are bound to object to this invasion.
The procedure by the United States District Court would accordingly affect
persons and documentation outside the executive power and jurisdiction of the
United States.
The Netherlands Government has directed Mr. van Roijen to emphasize that
it would lead to serious conflicts of jurisdiction if a Government, with or without
transgression of the limits of international law, unilaterally institutes proceedings
against foreign companies engaged in activities, essentially falling within the
jurisdiction of their home countries.
Furthermore, the activities of the United States District Court are of such a far-
reaching nature that they may unfavorably affect the interests of harmonious inter-
national trade, especially if other States would take counter measures or would
feel encouraged by the example of the United States to take similar measures in-
volving documentation outside their jurisdiction.
The Netherlands Ambassador therefore is instructed to express the grave concern
of the Netherlands Government about the above mentioned action of the United
States District Court which directly involves the interests of Netherlands shipping
companies, and to state that the Government would welcome any steps that could
be taken to ensure that the subpoenas issued to Netherlands shipping companies
be withdrawn.
61. 42 DEP'T STATE BULL. 501 (1960).
62. 35 Pacific Shipper No. 5, p. 23, March 21, 1960. Compare Prof. Metzger's remarks
in Proceedings, American Branch, Int'l Law Assn., 1959-60, May 13, 1960, p. 72-75.
63. It the Matter of Grand Jury Investigation of the Shipping Industry, 1960 Trade
Cas. ff 69746 (D.D.C. 1960).
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Failure to use available diplomatic channels for consultation does not benefit
the United States. Prior to the Shipping Industry investigation, the Italian
Government could easily have been notified under the Restrictive Business
Practices Clause of our Treaty. This early discussion might well have avoided
the protest note, expedited the actual production of documents located in the
United States, and speeded up the resolution of the issues involved. It might
have uncovered an alternative solution to the situation bothering the Justice
Department-a solution perhaps eliminating the need for an antitrust "big
case" completely.
Of course, discussions must be conducted in a climate of accommodation to
the varying interests of the sovereign parties involved. But most importantly,
the time to talk is before the serious phases of an antitrust investigation are
begun.
Removing Trade Barriers
One of the principal aims of the commercial treaty program of the United
States is to obtain foreign government assurance that American business can
operate in a foreign country on a basis of true competitive equality with local
concerns. Equal opportunity in a wide range of commercial and industrial activi-
ties is a basic commitment of these treaties. For example, the American business-
man is assured the right to manage his business affairs, to hire workers of his
choice on the local labor market, to obtain patent and trademark rights, and
to be protected against discriminatory taxation, to the same extent as his local
counterpart. American firms are assured the same economic favors received
from foreign governments by state-controlled competitors. Where the Ameri-
can's competitor is the foreign nation itself, the treaties provide guaranties
of nondiscriminatory treatment in the awarding of government contracts and
concessions and in the carrying out of nationalization programs. The American
firm is permitted to withdraw its capital and earnings to the extent feasible in
light of the foreign exchange position of the country. 64
Government-guaranteed competitive equality might be nullified if private
foreign practices effectively blockade doors opened to American business by
the commercial treaty program. An example of private restraints might be an
industry-wide agreement not to import a particular item at all, or to import
it solely from a designated group of nonlocal sources, which did not include
the United States. These foreign restrictive practices might be entirely legal,
locally, and quite impossible to prosecute from the United States. Even if
prosecution in the United States might be theoretically possible, prosecution
64. The examples cited are only a few of the rights and privileges often conceded to
American firms by foreign governments under the commercial treaty program. An ex-
cellent description and comparative analysis of the more important treaty provisions in all
significant commercial treaties has just been published: UNITED STATES COUNCIL, INTER-
NATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, RIGHTS OF BUSINESSMEN ABROAD UNDER TRADE AGREE-
74ENT5 AND CQM ERCmAr, TRzATIES p. 62 (1960).
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might be wholly impractical because of the ineffectiveness of the remedy, the
cost and effort involved, or the intergovernmental conflict to be anticipated.
In this situation, a new and creative use for the Restrictive Business Practices
Clause becomes apparent.
In this "antitrust" provision, the United States and the foreign government
have recognized the basic undesirability of harmful effects on their commerce
which might result from business practices which restrain competition, limit
access to markets, or foster monopolistic control. The American firm wanting
to break into the blockaded foreign market should pounce on this language.
It gives the State Department a green light to request negotiations leading to
the opportunity for entry by the American firm into the foreign market. Nego-
tiation of this type obviously can not be a one-sided demand by the United
States that the foreign industry or government fall into line with our antitrust
doctrines.0 5 We should be prepared to offer clear proof of the existence of
the restraint and of its harmful effects upon the commerce between the two
countries. In many cases, we will find that national legislation and national
business practices requiring trade restraints are indispensable to the economic
well-being and development of the individual nation. As relatively noncontro-
versial examples, trademark and patent monoplies are considered entirely proper
trade restraints, around the world. Comity demands that the commercial policies
of a foreign nation receive the same respect that the Department of Justice insists
be accorded United States antitrust laws. This is particularly so where the
language of the Restrictive Business Practices Clause is no more specific than
the instruction of most of our antitrust laws.
In contrast, a much more generalized treaty provision has been proposed
as another legal stepping stone for intergovernmental consultation on barriers
in international commerce. During the summer of 1959, Norwegian experts
suggested that article XXIII, paragraph I, of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) be applied to restrictive business practices. The provision
reads:
If any contracting party should consider that any benefit accruing to it
directly or indirectly under this Agreement is being nullified or impaired
or that the attainment of any objective of the Agreement is being impeded
as the result of (a) the failure of another contracting party to carry out
its obligations under this Agreement, or (b) the application by another
contracting party of any measure, whether or not it conflicts with the
provisions of this Agreement, or (c) the existence of any other situation,
the contracting party may, with a view to the satisfactory adjustment of
the matter, make written representations or proposals to the other con-
tracting party or parties which it considers to be concerned. Any con-
65. Hearings, supra note 52, at 684-99; Hearings, supra note 49, 1839-48; Hearings
Before the House Select Committee on Small Business, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. II, at
388-401 (1957) (testimony of Assistant Secretary of State Kalijarvi) ; see OTTo, THE
HUMAN ENTERPRISE 146, 148-49 (1940).
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tracting party thus approached shall give sympathetic consideration to
the representations or proposals made to it.66
In addition, article XXII of GATT provides that the contracting parties shall
accord "sympathetic consideration" to any representations made by other con-
tracting parties regarding any matter affecting the operation of the Agreement.
These two GATT provisions are essentially catchall in nature, written without
thought of antitrust objectives. By giving a protesting government a peg
to hang its protest on, they perhaps are useful technical devices. But their
vague, generalized language is not nearly as satisfactory for freeing inter-
national trade of unnecessary business restraints as the Restrictive Business
Practices Clause.67
This more active use of the clause as a means of promoting international
trade requires particular care in its application. It goes beyond the "tranquil-
izing" function, and might itself become a disrupter of foreign tranquility.
The Department of Justice recently declared that American companies invest-
ing abroad may find that, in order to enter foreign trade, they are required
to enter into arrangements which might violate the Sherman Act. The De-
partment suggested that the Restrictive Business Practices Clause be invoked
by the United States in order to negotiate elimination of restraints in particular
cases.6 s This position, not publicly supported by the Department of State, is
based upon inducing the interested foreign government to back down and to
"eliminate restraints in particular cases." The nature of the arrangements
referred to were not made clear. Joint ventures with local firms are affirma-
tively encouraged by United States policy. Local price fixing in foreign
markets, with very indirect effects on United States foreign commerce, would
hardly be a restraint warranting bilateral governmental negotiations. But if
an American company investing abroad were forced to agree not to import
from the United States, and not export to the United States from its foreign
base, there might well be a case for invoking the clause.
Let us therefore make clear that the object of American negotiations would
not be a revision of the foreign nation's laws to conform with ours. At most
it would be a lifting of the specific restraints having harmful effects on the two
countries' commerce in the particular situation. Case-by-case discussion and
appropriate individualized action are all that are called for by the clause. They
are all that are needed, as a practical matter.
66. Other multinational approaches are suggested from time to time. See S. Con. Res.
85, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 106 CoNG. Rzc. 1709 (daily ed., Feb. 3, 1960).
67. 61 Stat. (5), (6), T.I.A.S. No. 1700 (1947).
68. Daily Report for Executives, February 11, 1960, pp. A-4 & A-5. This attitude is
repeated by the acting head of the antitrust division, Robert A. Bicks, in a letter to Sen.
Jacob K. Javits, dated June 17, 1959:
We believe that intergovernmental discussion may be very helpful in dealing with
the problem of business compulsion upon an American company in a foreign
country whether exerted directly or indirectly by a foreign government or by a
cartelized industry.
106 CONG. REc. 5762-63 (daily ed., March 22, 1960).
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CONCLUSION
The present period in American history would seem to be one in which
essentially domestic policies such as antitrust should be required to serve the
broad national interest in foreign relations. Imaginative use of the Restrictive
Business Practices Clause may yet become a valuable link between these two
important American policies. The clause can serve as a soothing agent prior
to deciding to institute antitrust proceedings against foreign nationals in the
United States. It may also lubricate the channels of international commerce
when they become stuck by trade restraints. Consultation between govern-
ments is always preferable to unilateral litigation in the courts of one of the
affected nations.
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